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The Professional Liability Crisis and the Need for
Professional Limited Liability Companies:
Washington's Model Approach
Bryan Smith*
Litigation and its threat have begun to metastasize to virtually every
sector of the economy. Retailers sue manufacturers, franchisees sue
franchisers, commercial tenants sue office and mall developers, and
everyone sues accountants.1
People never used to sue lawyers, just doctors. .. But (now) they
are suing lawyers.2
Ambulance chasers used to be confined to automobile accidents[.]
Now . business accidents are a lot more valuable.'
I. INTRODUCTION
There is currently a crisis in this country,4 involving the liability
of professionals-lawyers and accountants in particular s -to clients,
* B.A., Seattle Pacific University; J.D. 1995, Seattle University School of Law.
1. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 7 (1991).
2. L.M. Sixel, Limited Liability Shelters Business Partners, THE HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 26,
1992, at Business 1.
3. David C. Walters, Liability Crisis Threatens Auditors, CHRISTIAN SI. MONITOR, Dec.
28, 1992, at Economy 9.
4. See Thomas McCarrol, Who's Counting, TIME, Apr. 13, 1992, at 48 ("[Tihe accounting
profession is facing the most serious liability crisis in its history."); see generally OLSON, supra
note 1, at 317-24.
5. This Comment is limited to the discussion of issues relating to lawyers and accountants.
These two professions have been in the limelight of late because of the voluminous amount of
litigation against them. Although doctors are also currently being sued at an alarming rate, the
issues raised there are extremely different from those raised by lawyers and accountants, as the
injuries in a medical malpractice case are generally physical in nature, while lawyers and
accountants (usually) only cause financial injury when they are negligent.
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investors, and regulators. Professionals are being subjected to lawsuits
at an alarming rate,6 a large proportion of which have sprung out of
the savings and loan debacle.7 Although some of the litigation is
justified, many of the suits are warrantless wastes of precious judicial
resources 8
The accounting profession has been hit the hardest by the
outbreak in lawsuits,9 but lawyers are quickly becoming targets as
well. 10 The litigation trend has already had several detrimental effects
upon the accounting profession," including exorbitant increases in
insurance costs, cutbacks by firms in high risk areas, and failures of
national accounting firms.12 These same consequences will fall upon
the attorneys in this country if something is not done to change the
current system.
Several remedies are available to solve this problem, including
reform of the joint and several liability standard13 and reinstatement
6. See McCarrol, supra note 4, at 48 (discussing litigation against accountants); Alison L.
Cowan, Settlements Alarming Auditors and Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at D5 (discussing
lawsuits against lawyers and accountants).
7. McCarrol, supra note 4, at 48 (noting that roughly two thirds of recent litigation stems
from the Savings and Loan scandal).
8. For example, Rule 10b-5, see infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text, is often used by
investors to hedge against investment loss. See 138 CONG. REC. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12,
1992) (statements of Sen. Domenici); 138 CONG. REc. E2463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992)
(statements of Rep. Tauzin); see also Greenfield v. U.S. Healthcare, 146 F.R.D. 118 (E.D. Pa.)
(sanctioning plaintiffs for litigation abuses), affd, 22 F.3d 1274 (3d. Cir. 1993); Kennedy v.
Josephenthal, & Co., 635 F. Supp. 399, 405 (D. Mass. 1985) (sanctioning plaintiffs attorney for
bringing needless litigation), affd, 814 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1987).
9. See Norman B. Arnhoff, Professional Liability of Accountants, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 11, 1990,
at 1, 2.
10. See Andrew Leigh, Now It's the Lawyers Getting Hit With Liability Suits, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Mar. 19, 1992, at 10. Although this Comment focuses upon the problems with excessive
litigation arising against attorneys involved in banking and securities law, attorneys practicing in
other fields are not immune from the problems discussed here. First, all attorneys in a
partnership are personally liable for the negligent act of one lawyer representing a bank or
corporation that proposes a stock offering. Most firms that practice in banking and corporate law
also have attorneys engaged in other legal fields, all of whom will feel the bite of a lawsuit against
one of their partners. Second, malpractice suits are prevalent in all areas of the law. See, e.g.,
OLSON, supra note 1, at 317-24. Lawsuits against attorneys arising from the savings and loan
debacle and securities transactions are merely two examples of areas where litigation has risen to
new heights in recent years.
11. See Arthur Anderson & Co. et al., Liability Crisis in the United States: Impact on the
Accounting Profession, J. ACCT., Nov. 1992, at 19 [hereinafter Arthur Andersen].
12. See infra Part III.
13. See generally J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION §§ 19.01-.08 (rev. ed. 1988) (discussing joint and several liability standard); see also
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 260.030] (2d. edition
1992).
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of the privity requirement regarding audited financial statements.
However, this Comment focuses upon the need for a change in the
status quo of unlimited liability of professionals through use of the
partnership entity,"5 which mandates that each partner's interest in
the partnership and her personal assets be available to creditors. 6
A new entity, the limited liability company (LLC), provides an
answer to the unlimited liability problem of professionals. First
introduced in Wyoming in 1977,17 LLC legislation has been codified
in forty-eight states (including the District of Columbia),18 and is
being considered by each remaining state in one form or another.19
Washington passed its LLC statute in April, 1994, and it became
effective on October 1, 1994.2o
14. Traditionally, an accountant was liable only to those with whom she was in "privity" of
contract, or any known beneficiary at the time of the undertaking. See Ultramares v. Touche, 174
N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). However, in many jurisdictions this doctrine has been eliminated. See,
e.g., Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
15. Most firms currently practice in either partnership or sole proprietorship form. See 1
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 15.05, at 15-6
n.20 (1992).
16. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (1914).
17. Act of March 4, 1977, ch. 155, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 512. The Wyoming Act is now
codified at WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (Supp. 1994).
18. ALA. CODE § 10-12 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -847 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32 (Michie Supp. 1993); 1994
Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1200 (Deering); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80 (1994); 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts
267 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18 (1993); 1994 D.C. Stat. 138; FLA. STAT. ch.
608.401-.514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11 (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE
§§ 53-601 to -672 (Supp. 1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, act 180 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1995); IND. CODE § 23-18 (Michie Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A (West Supp. 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 to -7652 (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275 (Michie/-
Bobbs-Merrill 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-1369 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASs'NS § 4A (Supp. 1994);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West 1994-95); MINN. STAT. § 322B (1993);
1994 Miss. Laws 402; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.010-.187 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-8 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-26 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86 (1993); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C (Supp. 1993); N.J. REV. STAT. § 42:2B (West 1994); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-19 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LIM. LIAB. CO. LAW (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705 (Anderson
1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 2000-2060 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63 (1993); 1994 Pa.
Laws 106; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16 (1993); 1994 S.C. Acts 448; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-
34 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-201 to -248 (1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1000 to -
1073 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 31-1(A) (Supp. 1994);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-.1305 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. § 17-15 (Supp. 1994).
19. See John Cunningham, The New Era in Corporate Law: New N.H. Business Organization
Law is an Option Many have to Consider, N.H. BUS. REV., July 23, 1993, at 2.
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15 (1994).
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Of the states that have enacted LLC statutes, thirty-nine have
specifically provided for professionals within the legislation, including
Washington. At this time, three states prohibit professionals from
becoming LLCs (including California and Oregon),21 thirty-six allow
them to do so,22 and the remainder of the states omit any mention of
use by professionals.2
This Comment argues that every state should allow professionals
to take advantage of LLC statutes, as Washington has done. Such
action will provide protection for accountants and lawyers from the
wave of litigation that has surfaced in recent times and to restore an
element of confidence to these professions. This Comment further
asserts that allowing professionals to use LLC statutes is not only
consistent with the duties peculiar to the accounting and legal
professions, but also a necessary step when viewed in light of the
policies of fairness, efficiency, and public protection.
Initially, Part II of this Comment describes the litigation crisis in
this country and the sources of and reasons for the crisis. Part III
21. OR. REV. STAT. § 63.074(2) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-3 (1992); 1994 Cal. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 1200 § 93 (Deering).
22. ALA. CODE § 10-12-4(s) (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-841 to -847
(Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-103(d) (Michie Supp. 1993); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. 267
(West); 1994 D.C. Stat. 138; FLA. STAT. ch. 621.02 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
11-1107(f) (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-605(2) (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-2-2
(Burns Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.1501-1519 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17- 7 60 4 (q) (Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.005 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-02 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-
203(9) (Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 611 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 450.4901-4910 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 319A.03, 322B.12 (West
Supp. 1995); 1994 Miss. Laws 402; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-1301 to -1307 (Supp. 1993);
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.015, .035 (Vernon Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2603(15) (Supp.
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-D (Supp. 1993); N.Y. LlIM. LIAB. Co. LAW § 1201 (1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01(C) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-31-03.1 (Supp. 1993); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.03(6) (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2001, 2002
(West Supp. 1995); 1994 Pa. Laws 106; 1994 S.C. Acts 448; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-
13A-1, 13B-1 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-248-101, -202 (Supp. 1994); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 1101 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-105(1)(r)
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1100 to -1123 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1994) WASH. REV. CODE
§ 25.15.045 (1994); WYO. STAT. § 17-19-103(b) (1994).
23. Some states that omitted any mention of professionals have recognized use of LLCs by
professionals in other areas of statutory law. For example, Colorado's accountancy statute-allows
for accounting practices to become LLCs. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-2-102 (Supp. 1994). The
Colorado Supreme Court has also modified rule 265 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to
allow attorneys to practice as LLCs. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. R. CIV. P. 265. (effective
Nov. 1, 1991); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 459 (1992) (noting amendment by Colorado Supreme Court). This
change, without a corresponding statutory amendment, may present a problem in the future. See
Keatinge, supra, at 459 n.639 .
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discusses the current and potential future effects of the crisis if it is not
addressed by lawmakers. Part IV introduces the LLC as a remedy for
the effects of excessive litigation, describes the Washington LLC Act
as it applies to professionals, shows how various statutes have
addressed the issue of LLC use by professionals, and demonstrates
how the LLC fits within the ethical codes of the legal and accounting
profession. Part V of this Comment then illustrates how the LLC will
help to remedy the litigation crisis, while Part VI shows why the LLC
is a proper entity for professionals, and asserts that the Washington
LLC act provides an ideal compromise between the interests of
professionals and consumers. Finally, Part VII concludes that the
LLC can provide professionals with much needed relief from the perils
of excessive litigation, but that in order to do so, every state must
follow Washington's lead and pass or amend legislation to permit
professionals to utilize LLCs.
II. THE CRISIS
Lawsuits against professionals are at an all-time high.24 This
Part describes the various aspects of this crisis. Section A describes
how it has hit the accounting profession; section B does the same with
regard to attorneys; section C illustrates the sources of the crisis, while
section D explains why professionals have come under such intense
legal scrutiny over the last three years.
A. Accountants
The accounting profession has been hit the hardest by the
explosion in litigation, 5 and the crisis has been termed "the premier
threat to the profession. ' 26  As one commentator recently noted,
"[t]he problems with the accounting profession.., can be summed up
in one word: liability."2 7  In addition, a prominent figure in the
profession has stated that, "[the profession's] liability burden is more
than five times that of the manufacturers seeking product liability
24. See Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 22 (giving statistics which illustrate that litigation
against accountants is at highest point ever); OLSON, supra note 1, at 317-24 (noting the
increasing litigation against attorneys).
25. See McCarrol, supra note 4, at 48.
26. David R. Sands, Accountants around the Globe See Rise in Professional Liability Suits,
WASH. TIMs, Oct. 20, 1992, at C3.
27. Matt Roush, Liability Is No. I Issue for Accountants, CRAIN'S DETROIT BUS., Jan. 25,
1993, at 8.
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relief."2  Some of the most prominent cases against accountants
include:
- a $400 million settlement between Ernst & Young and federal
thrift regulators; 2
9
- a $338 million judgment recently levied against Price Water-
house by an Arizona jury;3"
- a $200 million verdict against Coopers & Lybrand by a jury in
Texas;31
- an agreement by Arthur Andersen to pay $22 million to settle
private lawsuits regarding its part in the Lincoln Savings and Loan
Failure;32 and
- the recent $312 million settlement reached between federal
regulators and Deloitte & Touche in an action in which the govern-
ment sought $1.4 billion in damages from the firm. 3
In relation to revenue, litigation costs for accounting firms have
risen from 7.7% in 1990,34 to 9.0% in 1991,"5 to a high of 14.3% in
1992.36 Furthermore, the number of suits filed against accountants
has increased each year over the past ten years.37 A recent survey
reports that between 1987 and 1991, ninety-six percent of accounting
firms with over fifty members experienced an increase in their liability
exposure.38 The industry as a whole now faces over thirty billion
dollars in pending lawsuits.39
The most disturbing factor is that, although the largest firms are
most often mentioned with regard to the crisis, 40 smaller firms are
28. FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, Aug. 10,
1994, at 07, available in LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY]
(statement of J. Michael Cook, Chairman and CEO, Del6itte & Touche, LLP).
29. Geoffrey F. Aronow, Accountants Lead the Latest Charge for Liability Reform, INSIGHTS,




33. See Jerry Knight, Fourth S&L Auditor Settles U.S. Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,
1994, at F1; Larry Black, Failure of Deloitte Talks Raises Spectre of Ruin; Record Professional
Negligence Settlement with US Government Feared Over Savings and Loan Scandal, INDEPENDENT,
June 19, 1993, at 19.
34. Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20.
35. Id.
36. Albert B. Crenshaw, Accountants Plead for Relief, 6 Biggest Firms Say They Face $30
Billion in Liability Claims, WASH. POST, June 12, 1993, at D1.
37. See Alan Breznick, More Firms Suit Up for Legal Struggles, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 27,
1992, at 33.
38. Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20.
39. Id.
40. See id.; Aranow, supra note 29 (listing several recent cases against Big Six firms).
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feeling the pains of litigation as well. A recent survey showed that
firms outside the six largest experienced a two-thirds increase in
litigation between 1987 and 1991, and have seen a 300 percent increase
in liability premiums since 1985.41
B. Attorneys
Although accountants clearly lead the liability race,42 attorneys
are not far behind.43 Enormous verdicts against attorneys have
become commonplace in recent years," and a large number of suits
arising from the savings and loan crisis have been filed against
attorneys.45 Two of the more well known cases have involved the
lawyers working with the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan: the Kaye
Scholer settlement of $41 million in the face of a freeze on its assets by
the Office of Thrift Supervision,46 and the $24 million that Cleveland
megafirm Jones Day Reavis & Pogue paid out to settle its portion of
the damage resulting from the now infamous thrift's failure.47
Indeed, law firms are beginning to experience the effects of the
litigation. As one expert noted, "[t]hey're laying people off, and now
they're faced with significant cash outlays, and I think you may see
more partnerships dissolve just because they're not going to be able to
pay the bills."48  The statistics support this statement: 100 of the
largest law firms in this country eliminated between five and ten
percent of their partnership positions between 1990 and 1992," and
an estimated 256 lawsuits arising from the savings and loan scandal
remained to be filed against attorneys at the end of 1992.0 One
partner of a New York firm summed up the current state of the
41. Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20-21.
42. Arnhoff, supra note 9, at 2.
43. See Andrew Leigh, Now It's the Lawyers Getting Hit with Liability Suits, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Mar. 19, 1992, at 10; Jennifer E. King, Recent Malpractice Suits Driving up the Cost of
Lawyers' Liability Insurance, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1992, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library,
ILT File; Donna K. H. Walters, New Liability Twist has Lawyers, Accountants Scurrying, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at D1.
44. See King, supra note 43 (discussing megaverdicts against large law firms).
45. See id. at *3.
46. Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, Freeing Corporate Professional Advisers from the
Threat of RICO Liability, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at Outside Counsel 1.
47. King, supra note 43, at *1; Lee Berton & Joann S. Lublin, Partnership Structure Called
in Question as Liability Risk Rises, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1992, at A9.
48. Cowan, supra note 6, at D8.
49. See Berton & Lublin, supra note 47, at Al, A9.
50. King, supra note 43, at *3 (according to one expert's estimate).
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profession: "You have to be out of your mind to be a partner in a law
firm today.""1
C. Sources of the Crisis
1. Savings and Loan Failures
a. Introduction
Much has been made of the banking scandal of the '80s and the
bailout and cleanup of the '90s,5" and for good reason. Approximate-
ly 550 thrift institutions have failed53 as a result of the overly aggres-
sive (and frequently fraudulent) practices employed by those institu-
tions, and the estimates of the cost to the taxpayer to clean up the mess
continue to grow,5 4  running between $200 and $500 billion.5
Because of these failures, and because few officers and directors of the
failed thrifts have any assets remaining, 6 the federal government has
become preoccupied with identifying a "meaningful class of deep
pockets on whom to affix responsibility for these woes."57  Thus,
regulators and judges have turned toward professionals to answer for
their contribution" and more. 9
51. Berton & Lublin, supra note 47, at Al, A9. Although, on its face, this statement may
seem a bit overreaching (indeed, it was made by a partner at Kaye, Scholer), the principle
underlying the remark is valid: All partners in law firms organized as partnerships are personally
liable when one banking or securities lawyer makes a negligent error. See supra notes 10 and 13.
Because nearly all large firms have at least one bank and several large corporations for clients,
every partner in those firms puts her house on the line with every opinion letter written. The
mere fact that one partner may practice in estate planning does not protect him from paying his
portion of a $30 million judgment against a banking partner.
52. See Alison L. Cowan, Big Law and Auditing Firms to Pay Millions in S&L Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at Al, D21; Harvey L. Pitt and Dixie L. Johnson, The Banking Scandal:
A New Era of Standards for Professionals?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 1992, at Outside Counsel 1.
53. American Professions; On the Defensive, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1992, at 90.
54. Pitt and Johnson, supra note 52, at 1.
55. See David B. Newdorf, Comment, Inside Fraud, Outside Negligence and the Savings and
Loan Crisis: When Does Management Wrongdoing Excuse Professional Malpractice?, 26 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1165, 1170 n.23 (1993) (showing estimates at $200 billion and $500 billion).
56. See id. at 1168 (noting that the only "deep pockets" left are the insurers of the
professionals).
57. Pitt and Johnson, supra note 52, at 1.
58. See id.; see also Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C.
1990) ("Where were these professionals ... when these clearly improper transactions were being
consummated? Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions? Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions were
effectuated?")
59. The doctrine of joint and several liability is often applied in the Savings and Loan cases,
which allows for any party responsible for a portion of the loss to bear the entire amount of the
damages proven.
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Three agencies have been given congressional power to enforce the
cleanup process through litigation. These agencies include the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).60
Each of these agencies has filed a significant number of lawsuits against
professionals.61 The only "deep pockets" remaining when a thrift
fails are the professional malpractice insurers and the professional firms
themselves.62
The involvement of professionals in the banking scandal is a
complex issue that often spans several legal doctrines. The issues
involved may be simplified and illustrated by a hypothetical situation
involving thrift misconduct.
b. A Hypothetical Thrift Failure
63
In a typical thrift failure, the officers and or directors of the
institution have attempted to increase the profits of the institution by
directly investing depositors' funds in risky real estate ventures.
However, an extreme downturn in the market for real estate has caused
the value of the property to sink far below the amount paid for it by
the thrift. In fact, often the decrease in the value of the property
greatly exceeds the amount of capital put up by the institution, causing
the thrift to be insolvent. Rather than report this condition to the
appropriate federal agency, the officers of the thrift then embark on
even more speculative measures, offering to purchase land from an
investor who will in turn purchase the original property that the thrift
had purchased. Both sides do so for more than market value, without
any cash input from either side. To close the deal, the thrift agrees to
loan the investor a portion of the purchase price on a nonrecourse
basis.64
This entire second transaction is in violation of federal law,65 but
the officers of the thrift have covered this up by making all of the
transactions through dummy corporations.66 The transactions have
60. See Newdorf, supra note 55, at 1165 n.1, 1170 n.21.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 1170.
63. This hypothetical is derived from David B. Newdorfs article, appearing in the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review. See id. at 1166.
64. For an example of a similar land transaction, see id. at 1170 n.19.
65. Banks are limited both in the amount they may lend as a percent of capital, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 84(a)(2) (1988) (ten percent limit), and in the amount they may lend to insiders, id. at
§ 375(b)(1) (1988) (same terms as noninsiders).
66. A "dummy" corporation is one "formed for sham purposes and not for conduct of
legitimate business .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 502 (6th ed. 1990).
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been conducted by two separate law firms, so that neither one would
suspect the overall nature of the deal. If either firm had looked below
the surface, the dummy corporations would have been discovered. The
deals produce a huge profit for the thrift, and because they appeared
to be arms-length transactions, the accountants approved the amount
on the financial statements.
However, when the real estate market worsens, both the thrift and
the investor default on the outstanding loans. This wipes out any
capital the thrift had, leaving a negative net worth. The Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)67 then pays off the
depositors from the federal insurance fund and closes the institution.
The agencies come after the professionals involved, alleging that both
the lawyers and accountants must have turned a blind eye to the
fraudulent activity.
The agency typically alleges several causes of action against both
the attorneys and the accountants, including: professional negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrich-
ment, aiding and abetting management in violations of legal and
fiduciary duties, fraud and deceptive trade practices.68 The key
allegation is professional negligence; the agency asserts that the
professionals involved were negligent in failing to discover the
fraudulent activity, and that this negligence proximately caused the
losses of the savings and loan. 69
The above scenario generally describes what happened to many of
the failed thrifts across this country70 and gives a fairly accurate
description of the nature of the professional involvement in the savings
and loan crisis. However, that debacle has been only one of the
primary sources of litigation against professionals.
2. Start Up Companies/Securities Litigation
The next largest source of litigation against lawyers and accoun-
tants is casually referred to as 10b-5 litigation.7" The term "10b-5"
refers to rule 10b-5,72 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
67. The FSLIC has now been absorbed into the FDIC. See Newdorf, supra note 55, at 1170
n.21.
68. See id. at 1173-74 n.47.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1166.
71. See Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 23 (noting that 10b-5 suits represent nearly one-
third of the current litigation against the accounting profession); Adam F. Ingber, 10b-5 or not
1Ob-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
S351, S356-58 (1994).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
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Commission to implement section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, dealing with fraudulent securities offerings.73
In a typical 10b-5 case, investors purchase securities of a new or
existing corporation. Attorneys and accountants are involved with the
prospectus for the offering in several ways.74 The accountant's most
common responsibility is the audit of the financial statements.7" Not
surprisingly, many companies whose securities are put on the market
do not perform to the expectations of the investors, and an action is
brought against the accountants and/or the attorneys for the failure to
disclose certain information about the company that would have caused
the investors not to purchase the securities.76
There are many sources of litigation against professionals. The
number of lawsuits stemming from the savings and loan crisis and the
increase in securities litigation are just two highly publicized examples
of what has become a very large problem in this country. The more
crucial question is one that underlies the above information: Why are
the professionals feeling the greatest weight of the litigation arising
from these situations?
D. Why Sue Professionals?
There are several reasons that the enormous number of suits
arising out of both the savings and loan situation and 10b-5 litigation
are filed against professionals. This section briefly discusses each of
those reasons.
One reason asserted by some courts is that professionals may
obtain malpractice insurance to cover any judgment or settlement. As
the court in Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler77 indicated: "Independent
auditors have apparently been able to obtain liability insurance
covering these risks or otherwise to satisfy their financial obligations.
We have no reason to believe that they may not purchase malpractice
insurance policies that cover their negligent acts ... ."78 The court
went on to note that the accountants could pass the cost of the
insurance on to their customers, who could in turn pass the cost on to
the entire consuming public.79
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1988).
74. See Lawrence R. Bard, A Distinct-Responsibility Approach to Accountant's Primary
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 193, 203 (1992).
75. Id. (describing audit function).
76. See id. at 204.
77. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
78. Id. at 151.
79. Id. at 153 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)).
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Another reason professionals are sued so frequently is because
they may be held liable for mere negligence, while the client corpora-
tion's officers and directors are often protected by the business
judgment rule, which incorporates a standard of gross negligence. 0
Thus, there are circumstances where the professionals involved will be
liable, while the direct wrongdoers are exculpated."
Professionals are also being sued because they are the only solvent
parties remaining when the thrift or business goes under.8 2 Indeed,
the larger professional firms often have a substantial amount of capital
built up. 3 The targeting of the assets and insurance coverage of
these firms is referred to as the "deep pocket" theory.8 4
The "deep pocket" reasoning leads, in turn, to the issue of joint
and several liability.8" Under this doctrine, even though the profes-
sionals may be only ten percent responsible for the loss, they must pay
the entire amount of damage if found negligent.8 6 This encourages
plaintiffs to sue only the professionals because their pockets are usually
the deepest.
Yet another reason professionals are being sued at record highs is
because the public is looking for someone upon whom it can affix
blame. The low public perception of professionals makes them an easy
target.8 7 The public outrage over the savings and loan debacle has
only fueled the increase of lawsuits against professionals, and these
lawsuits help satisfy the public's desire for retribution.8 Indeed,
"lawyer bashing" has become a national pastime as evidenced by a
recent beer commercial where cowboys rope lawyers instead of bulls. 9
This perception has been furthered by the judiciary, who are of the
opinion that the professionals are in large part responsible for the
80. See Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary Duty and the Former Partner, 48 BUS. LAW. 315, 315
n.2 (1992).
81. See id.
82. See Ron Cooper, Accountant Malpractice Claims Rising, BUS. FIRST-LOUISVILLE, Jan.
28, 1991, at *3 (available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File).
83. See Roush, supra note 27, at 8.
84. See Cooper, supra note 82, at *3.
85. See supra notes 10 and 13 (discussing joint and several liability standard).
86. Id.
87. See Robert Rice, Business and the Law: Tied up in Claims for Damages-US Lawyers are
Concerned at the Growing Trend to Sue Them When Financial Institutions Fail, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1993, at 18 (describing lawyer television commercial); Newdorf, supra note 55, at 1170-71.
88. See Pitt and Johnson, supra note 52, at 1.
89. See Rice, supra note 87, at 18.
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savings and loan crisis.90 Many professionals have described this
viewpoint as "scapegoatism. '"
A final reason that professionals have been sued is that some
professionals have performed at a severely substandard or even
fraudulent level,92 making it even easier for the thrifts and start-up
companies to deceive investors and regulators. In such cases, the
professionals deserve whatever damages they incur.93 However, these
situations represent the exception rather than the rule. In the majority
of situations, fraudulent activities of thrift management, often
undetectable by the professionals involved, has been the primary cause
of bank failures.94
In sum, when professionals are negligent and have not been
deceived by the client, they deserve to pay for the damage that they
have proximately caused. However, bringing lawsuits against attorneys
and accountants either because they have significant assets and
insurance or for retributive purposes is unfair, especially where
professionals are responsible for only a minimal portion of the total
damage. This practice will devastate both the accounting and legal
professions if it is not properly addressed.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS IF LEFT UNCHECKED
This Part details the potential effects of the litigation crisis.
Several of the statistics and arguments included in this Part are derived
from a recent study95 provided by the big six accounting firms96 to
several federal agencies and members of Congress. Although the
arguments presented will, in most cases, reflect the effects of litigation
from an accountant's standpoint, the impact on the legal profession
would likely follow a similar path. Therefore, most of the arguments
will be put in terms of professionals in general, rather than simply
90. See, e.g., Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 913, 920 (D.D.C. 1990)
(blaming failure on professionals' failure to act).
91. See Timothy D. Naegele, Rabid Regulators Want Your Hide, AM. BANKER, May 27,
1992, at 4 (attributing professional liability suits to "scapegoatism").
92. See McCarrol, supra note 4, at 49 (discussing GAO study finding evidence of
substandard professional performance); Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 21 (acknowledging
some poor performance).
93. See Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 21.
94. See, e.g., Newdorf, supra note 55, at 1169.
95. Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 19.
96. The Big Six accounting firms are the six largest in this country and worldwide. They
include Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, Coopers & Lybrand, Price
Waterhouse, and KPMG Peat Marwick.
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accountants. Any effects that are especially peculiar to one profession
or the other will be noted.
A. Insurance
One consequence of the litigation explosion that has already begun
to materialize is the increase in the cost of professional malpractice
insurance.97
Accounting firms with over fifty members have experienced a 300
percent increase in insurance premium costs since 1985.98 Law firms
are experiencing similar inflation; it now costs between $5,000 and
$12,000 per attorney, per year in some areas to insure a firm against
malpractice liability.99 These premiums continue to rise at around
twenty percent per year.1' °
As premiums and deductibles increase, total coverage decreases.
The median deductible for accounting firms today is $240,000.o'
This is almost six times the median figure in 1985.102 Deductibles
for the largest firms now exceed $25 million for the first loss.1 3
However, obtaining the same level of coverage is becoming increasingly
difficult.')' While firms could obtain $200 million in coverage in the
past, they are lucky to obtain half of that amount now.l"'
An even more disturbing trend is that many firms, especially the
small to medium size firms, are "going bare," meaning that they
operate without insurance.106 This occurs for two reasons: first, as
noted above, the cost of liability insurance is spiraling out of control;
second, many insurers simply will not cover professionals (accountants
in particular) because of the enormous amount of risk and uncertainty
involved. 7 According to a recent survey, forty percent of firms
outside of the Big Six do not currently have insurance.08 This
development injures plaintiffs the most, as an adequate recovery is no
longer an option when one of these firms is sued.
97. See Walters, supra note 43, at Dl; Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20.
98. Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20.
99. See Walters, supra note 43, at D7.
100. King, supra note 43, at *2.
101. Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20.
102. Id. ($42,000).
103. Id.
104. See Cowan, supra note 6, at D8.
105. Id.
106. See Gene R. Barrett, New AICPA Chairman Sees a Bright Future for the Profession, J.
ACCT., Dec. 1992, at 86, 87.
107. McCarrol, supra note 4, at 50.
108. Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20-21.
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B. Changing Clients and Methods
Another consequence of excessive litigation is that professionals
are now seeking new ways to reduce their risk. O9 This strategy is
played out in several ways. These include avoidance of high-risk
clients and industries, implementation of client screening, and requiring
all work to be subject to additional checks. Each of these effects, while
injurious to professionals, will cause even further deleterious conse-
quences upon the professions, the financial marketplace, and the
economy.
One risk reduction method is the avoidance of high-risk indus-
tries.1 In the survey mentioned in the previous section, accounting
firms were asked whether the current litigious environment had
affected the services they offer. Fifty-six percent of those firms
answered that they had reduced or eliminated their practice in high-
risk industries, including financial institutions, real estate, and high
technology companies."' Companies making initial public offerings
made up another area of substantial cutbacks by accounting firms.
These companies are particularly vulnerable to 10b-5 litigation due to
the volatility of their stock prices." 2 The United States Supreme
Court recognized this problem in a recent case: "[E]xcessive litigation
can have ripple effects. For example, newer and smaller companies
may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals. A profession-
al may fear that a newer or smaller company may not survive and that
business failure would generate securities litigation against the
professional .... However, these firms provide a great deal of
innovation and worldwide competition for this country. They are also
the firms that are most in need of quality professional services." 4
Another method of risk management that accounting firms have
employed is the reduction or elimination of services they offer. This
means that the audit, which has historically been the life-blood of an
accounting practice,"' may be a thing of the past. The aforemen-
tioned survey showed that seventy-nine percent of the responding firms




113. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994).
114. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 22.
115. The audit provides sixty percent of the total revenue of accounting firms. McCarrol,
supra note 4, at 49.
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are cutting back on the services they offer, and some are abandoning
audits altogether." 6
These methods of risk reduction create significant problems. If
firms will not be audited because of the risk, then investors will not
put their capital into that company. If the high-risk company is
audited by a smaller, and possibly less qualified firm, there is greater
opportunity for fraudulent practices to occur," 7 If the former occurs,
then "[f]inancial markets could grind to a halt. . . . Investors are not
going to invest unless they see that stamp of approval."'18  If the
latter occurs, the savings and loan debacle could repeat itself.
The other risk reduction methods mentioned above, client
screening and extra checking of all work, primarily increase the cost of
accounting and legal services in general. The effects of this increase
will be further discussed in section D, below.
C. Loss of Talent
An additional impact on the professional environment is an overall
reduction in the number of qualified individuals seeking to enter and
remain in the professions. The accounting profession has already
experienced this phenomenon, as new recruits are reluctant to get into
the business'19 and qualified professionals are seeking to get out.
120
Although the overall legal profession may not yet have experienced this
effect, this is probably because a smaller percentage of lawyers are
involved in the corporate marketplace, where most of this litigation has
occurred. A true assessment of the impact could be obtained through
asking recent law school graduates with an interest in finance whether
they still intend to practice corporate banking or securities law.
The effects of a smaller talent base upon which to draw could be
far-reaching. Less talent means less qualified professionals, which
116. Aronow, supra note 29, at 20.
117. This can occur for several reasons. In theory, a small firm could be more easily
"pushed around" by a client such as Ford or General Motors, as that client would likely provide
over fifty percent of the firm's total revenue. In that case, the professionals would be less likely
to question a decision of management or the board of directors and more likely to push ethical
and legal limits for the sake of the client.
Additionally, a small accounting firm would be far less likely to uncover a fraudulent scheme
at a large corporation than a Big Six firm with far greater manpower and financial resources.
Finally, smaller firms will also, in theory, be made up of less talented professionals than large
firms. Thus, the professionals would not possess the skill to detect certain fraudulent schemes
that the most qualified attorney or accountant would uncover.
118. McCarrol, supra note 4, at 50 (internal quotations omitted).
119. David C. Walters, Liability Risk Worries Accounting Recruits, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1992, at Economy 9.
120. See id.
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could mean a further opportunity for fraudulent practices, and further
erosion of the already tarnished public image of both accountants and
lawyers.' However, the loss of professional talent, as serious as it
is, pales in comparison to the possible effect that excessive professional
litigation will have on the economic underpinnings of this country.
D. Economic Impact
The most significant impact of the litigation crisis will occur
within the financial marketplace."' The skyrocketing insurance
costs, the cost of client screening, and the cost of wasteful overchecking
of work all serve to increase the cost of running a business or making
a public offering. The economy could feel the effects of these increases
in a significant way.
These effects are demonstrated in detail by a recent study on the
potential effects of the professional litigation crisis.'23 The study,
performed by AUS Consultants, a Philadelphia research firm, showed
that litigation against professionals will cost the country over 224,000
jobs per year between 1992 and 1996; will increase the federal budget
deficit by $3.7 billion per year; will reduce real manufacturing output
by $6.9 billion per year; and will increase the cost of capital by 1.3%
over that period. 1 4
The study was based upon certain assumptions, including the
premise that insurance costs would continue to rise and that profes-
sional services would become more costly because of client screening
and reviewing of work.'25 The study further assumed that profes-
sionals would pass most of the costs on to their clients. 126 However,
the validity of these assumptions was strengthened by the Supreme
Court in Central Bank: "[IT]he increased costs incurred by profession-
als because of the litigation and settlement costs under 10b-5 may be
passed on to their client companies, and in turn incurred by the
company's investors ....17
The logical starting point for this economic crisis is within the
professional arena itself. Indeed, litigation has already brought some
surprisingly large firms to their knees.
121. See Arthur Andersen, supra note 11, at 20; McCarrol, supra note 4, at 48.
122. See Bill Atkinson, A Determined Defender of Lawyers, Accountants, AM. BANKER, Aug.
20, 1992, at 2.




127. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454.
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E. Loss of Professional Firms
Not only will the overall economy feel the heat of the crisis, but
the professions themselves will see prominent members fail or
substantially restructure their practices as a result of the burden of
litigation. Already, Laventhol & Horwath, once the seventh largest
accounting firm in the United States, has gone bankrupt. The primary
cause of this phenomenon was the 112 lawsuits pending against the
firm, forty of which sought a total of $351 million in damages.128 In
addition, Pannell Kerr Forster, another high-visibility accounting firm,
has closed or sold ninety percent of its offices. A prominent factor in
this decision was liability.
129
The Laventhol failure had far-reaching consequences throughout
the capital markets.13' Audits in process were interrupted, replace-
ment auditors had to be found, and the SEC had to adopt special rules
to accommodate the public companies that had been previously audited
by Laventhol. 3 ' All of the companies audited by the firm were put
under a cloud of uncertainty through no fault of their own.132
Several steps must be taken to curb the substantial effects
stemming from the litigation crisis. If no action is taken, the account-
ing and legal professions, the capital markets, and the economy as a
whole will suffer. Most of the available remedial measures are beyond
the scope of this Comment, and no single measure would solve the
litigation problems in this country. However, this Comment addresses
one option that will provide a foundation for a stronger professional
industry: The LLC.
IV. A REMEDY: THE LLC
This Part identifies a possible remedy to the above-described
problems apparent in today's professional arena. Section A introduces
the LLC and discusses its relevant attributes; section B discusses the
Washington Act and its professional provisions; section C shows the
various ways that the professional has been treated with respect to
LLC legislation; and section D shows how the LLC fits within the
current ethical codes and duties peculiar to professionals.
128. Douglas McLeod, Claims Help Sink Laventhol; Virtually All E(&O Coverage Depleted,
BUS. INS., Nov. 26, 1990, at 2.
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A. An Introduction to the LLC
1. History
First introduced in Wyoming in 1977, it was not until 1990 that
the LLC's popularity spread among the states.t 33  This was largely
a result of the Internal Revenue Service's decision in 1988 to treat the
Wyoming LLC as a partnership for federal tax purposes.'3 This
opened the floodgates to LLC legislation, as forty-five states enacted
LLC statutes between 1990 and the present, including Washing-
ton.' 3 Every state has now at least considered some form of LLC
legislation. 136
2. Attributes
This section addresses two key attributes of the LLC that are
relevant to this Comment: limited liability of LLC owners and tax
treatment of LLCs. 137
a. Limited Liability
Given its name, it is fairly clear that the LLC limits the liability
of its owners. The key question is, to what extent does the LLC
protect professionals from liability? The focus of the discussion here
is on professional liability, as opposed to liability for business debts.
Professionals in an LLC will only be able to limit their liability for the
negligence of other members of the firm.13' This logically follows
from the maxim that one is always liable for her own torts. In
addition, when a member of an LLC supervises or participates in a
negligent engagement, she will be personally liable under a vicarious
liability or respondeat superior theory. 9 Furthermore, the LLC
133. See Keatinge, supra note 23, at 384.
134. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
135. See supra note 18.
136. See supra note 19.
137. This Comment is not intended to provide a comprehensive review of LLCs. Rather,
the focus here is on those aspects of LLCs that are of particular significance to professionals. For
a complete overview of the LLC, see Keatinge, supra note 23.
138. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 434 (1991); AICPA Members to Vote on Proposal to Let CPA Firms Form
Corporations, Daily Tax Reports (BNA) No. 205, at G-1 (Oct. 23, 1990) (AICPA Vice President
Bernard Lee assured House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell that
individuals responsible for audits will not escape personal responsibility through the use of LLCs).
139. See Stephen E. Kalish, Lawyer Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firm: A
Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious
Liability on Some Lawyer Employees, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 580 (1987).
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itself remains vicariously liable for the negligent acts of any of its
members.14 °
b. Tax Treatment of LLCs
The Internal Revenue Service has published several rulings
classifying an LLC as a partnership for tax purposes. 14' The basis
of these rulings was that the entities had fewer than four of the six
characteristics necessary for corporate tax treatment.
142
These rulings were extremely significant because partnerships are
not taxed as an entity, but are subject to "flow through" treatment,
where the income of each partner "flows" to her individual tax
return.143  Thus, members of a partnership avoid the "double
taxation" problems that affect most corporations. 144 As such, the tax
benefits of LLCs are their most popular attribute, and are the primary
benefit of an LLC over another corporate form.
B. The Washington LLC Act
The Washington LLC Act permits professionals to practice as
LLCs. 145  The relevant section, WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.045
(1994), subjects a "Professional LLC" (PLLC) to all of the provisions
of WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100 (1994), the Washington professional
service corporation statute.
46
The statute also requires that at least one member of the LLC be
licensed in Washington, 4 and that each member personally practic-
ing in Washington be licensed in Washington.14' Furthermore, the
name of any firm that becomes an LLC must include the term
"Professional Limited Liability Company," or "P.L.L.C.
'149
Finally, and most importantly, Washington's LLC Act requires
that each PLLC maintain an insurance policy upon itself and its
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-93, 1993-2 C.B. 321 (Arizona); Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B.
316 (Utah); Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (Delaware); Rev. Rul 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360
(Wyoming).
142. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1994) (giving six characteristics of corporate
tax status).
143. See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702(a), 704(b) (1988).
144. Corporate income is taxed at the entity and shareholder level. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301
(1988).
145. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 25.15.045, 18.190.010 (1994).
146. WAsH. REV. CODE § 25.15.045 (1994).
147. Id. § 25.15.045(1)(a).
148. Id. § 25.15.045(lXb).
149. Id. § 25.15.045(4).
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members practicing in Washington in a minimum amount of
$1,0000,000.1s The Act further provides that the Insurance Commis-
sioner may require a greater amount for a specific profession.'
Washington is the first state to adopt a provision in its LLC
statute mandating professional liability insurance,' but other states
have implemented such a requirement in their Limited Liability
Partnership statutes or professional licensing acts.
5 3
Although Washington has clearly answered the issue raised by
this Comment, the recent enactment of LLC statutes in Oregon and
California that prohibit professionals from forming LLCs has kept the
issue in the forefront. Indeed, professional firms (and their clients) in
Washington are likely to do a large portion of their out-of-state
business within these two states.
When a suit is brought against them in California or Oregon,
Washington firms will likely be held to the liability standards which
exist there."5 4 Thus, even if a Washington firm becomes an LLC
under the Washington statute, the members of the firm will be
exposed to personal liability in California, Oregon, and any other state
which prohibits professional LLC practice.
Clearly, the Washington statute provides complete liability
protection only to small firms who neither practice nor serve any
clients doing business in Oregon or California. Furthermore, the
inconsistent treatment of professionals by LLC statutes in other states
creates even more uncertainty for Washington professionals.
C. Other LLC Legislation and Professionals
The majority of the LLC statutes from other states exclude any
mention of professionals. Presumably, this means that professionals
are allowed to take advantage of the statute. 5  However, this
Comment argues that each state legislature should specifically mention
professionals within its LLC statute to assure professionals that their
use of the LLC form is permitted by state law. This assurance is
150. Id. § 25.15.045(2).
151. Id.
152. WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES IN
WASHINGTON 10-9 (1994) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
153. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-2-117(3)(c) (Supp. 1994) ($150,000 per CPA
minimum for all claims, not to exceed $1,000,000 minimum); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, § 3.08(d)(A) ($100,000).
154. 1 LARRY R. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEAT1NGE, LIMITED LIABILrTY COMPANIEs
§ 13.04 (1994); Steven C. Crane, An Ethical Lawyer's Guide to LLC Firms, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 7,
1994, at Outside Counsel 1.
155. See Shop Talk: Tax Trap for Professionals Forming LLC, 79 J. TAX'N 63, 63 (1993).
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crucial; without it, many large firms with interstate practices may be
hesitant to take advantage of LLC legislation.
Currently, Rhode Island, Oregon, and California expressly
prohibit professionals from becoming LLCs.156 However, originally,
Arizona, Virginia and Maryland also excluded professionals, with the
latter two actually enacting "no professionals" clauses that were later
repealed. 117  Arizona amended its legislation before it became law,
due in large part to the lobby of the Arizona Society of Certified Public
Accountants. 158
The reasons given by the respective legislatures for denying
professionals were largely practical: The legislators involved were
under the belief that a bill limiting the liability of professionals would
be seen as "special interest" legislation and would not pass.159 The
statement of a Virginia legislator summed up the perspective of the
lawmakers:
Generally, in Virginia we did not want the legislators to perceive the
LLC [A]ct as special interest legislation. We had not received any
actual objections-there were just the informal discussions among
our drafting committee to the effect that if lawyers and accountants
are perceived to be the beneficiaries of this legislation it may be
more difficult to get it enacted. 160
An Arizona newspaper editorial also took this viewpoint, noting that,
"to avoid charges that the proposed legislation is simply a tool
fashioned by special interest groups-people such as lawyers, doctors,
or accountants-these professions have been omitted from Arizona's
LLC bill. 161
Conversely, several states have specifically provided that profes-
sionals may take advantage of their LLC statutes.162 These statutes
156. 1994 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1200 § 93 (Deering); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.074(2) (1994);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-3 (Supp. 1992).
157. See It's Time LLCs Make Sense; Let's Do It, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 21, 1991, at
Front 2 (editorial) [hereinafter It's Time] (discussing the proposed Arizona act's "no professionals"
clause); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1008 (Michie Supp. 1991) (prior to 1992 repeal) (denying
professionals); MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-201 (prior to 1993 repeal) (denying
professionals).
158. See Max Jarman, Legislature OKs Limited Liability Firms, ARIZ. BUS. GAZETTE, May
29, 1992, at Front 2.
159. See Sharon E. Connaughton, The Dawn of the Limited Liability Company in Virginia:
An Analysis of the Statute, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 177, 197 (1991).
160. Id.
161. See It's Time, supra note 157.
162. See supra note 22.
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typically provide a non-exclusive listing of professionals, which always
mentions lawyers and accountants.'63
D. The LLC vs. the Professional Corporation (PC)
Professionals may incorporate and limit their liability to some
extent in every state.1"4  Thus, professionals are already able to use
an entity that limits their liability. However, there are several
problems with the professional service corporation that make it an
ineffective vehicle for professionals to limit their liability. These
problems include tax disadvantages, lack of a limitation on professional
liability in some states, and restrictions on interstate practice.
First, there are tax disadvantages to being a PC. Because PCs are
corporate entities, they are subject to double taxation of income. This
is no small hurdle to a firm seeking to maximize its profits. 6 '
Indeed, a PC may pay even higher taxes than a similarly situated
corporation.166 As noted above, LLC members are subject to the
partnership tax laws, which provide for flow-through treatment of all
partner income, and thus only single taxation.
Second, several states do not limit the personal liability of
shareholders in a PC.167  In these states, the PC is completely
ineffective to protect professionals from having their personal assets
163. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-543 (Michie 1993) (listing professionals).
164. See Karen M. Maycheck, Shareholder Liability in Professional Legal Corporations: A
Survey of the States, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 817 (1986); Thomas W. Rimerman, The Need for
Expanding Organizational Options for CPAs, J. ACCT., Oct. 1991, at 45.
165. For example, if a corporation earns $100 in income, $34 of that profit would be paid
in taxes at the corporate level (assuming a corporate rate of thirty-four percent). When the
remaining $66 is distributed to the owners of the corporation through a dividend, that income is
taxed again at the personal rate of the owners (assume a thirty-one percent rate), resulting in a
net profit of $45 to the owners (the personal rate is applied to the $66 to obtain the $21 personal
tax).
However, when a partnership (or LLC) earns $100, this entire amount flows through to the
owners' personal tax returns (assuming the same thirty-one percent personal rate), resulting in $69
of net profit (a $24 increase over the owners' net profit under corporate form).
166. See I.R.C. § 11(bX2) (West 1994) (denying graduated tax rates to professional service
corporations).
167. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-905 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185 (1993); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 180.1915 (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 17-3-102 (1994).
Other states that have PC statutes limiting professional liability, but whose courts have
refused to acknowledge the limitation, include Hawaii, see HAW. REV. STAT. § 415A- 11 (1993)
(limiting innocent shareholder liability); but see In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw.
1973) (denying a limitation on shareholder liability for acts of other shareholders); North Carolina,
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-9 (1993); but see Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985); and Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 14-7-7 (1994); but see First Bank and Trust Co. v.
Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983) (denying a limit on professional liability of attorneys).
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
seized through a malpractice suit. LLC legislation in these states
would solve this problem.
Third, several PC statutes limit the amount of interstate practice
that a PC may conduct.'68 This hinders medium and larger size
firms from limiting their liability, as many firms of this size have
offices and clients in other states. Currently, no LLC legislation places
any restrictions on interstate commerce or practice."'
E. The LLC and Ethical Codes of Professionals
1. Accountants
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
specifies which entities may engage in the practice of public account-
ing. 70 In October 1990, the AICPA council sent a ballot to mem-
bers asking them whether accountants should be allowed to practice as
LLCs,17' and the measure was overwhelmingly approved.' The
vote amended rule 505 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct
to allow accountants to use any entity permitted by state law.'73
2. Attorneys
Similarly, both the American Bar Association's (ABA) Code of
Professional Responsibility 74 and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct'75 provide that an attorney may limit her liability for the
malpractice of her associates, but only to the extent permitted by state
168. See Rimerman, supra note 164, at 45, 48; Gilbert Simonetti & Andrea R. Andrews, A
Profession at Risk/A System in Jeopardy, J. ACCT., Apr. 1994, at 45, 47.
169. See Keatinge, supra note 23, at 375, 447.
170. Prior to its amendment in 1992, Rule 505 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct
provided in part: "A member may practice public accounting only in the form of a proprietor-
ship, a partnership, or a professional corporation whose characteristics correspond to resolutions
of the Council." AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 505.
171. See AICPA, supra note 138, at G2; Rimerman, supra note 164, at 45.
172. The resolution was approved by approximately ninety-two percent of the voting
members. Keatinge, supra note 23, at 459 n.642 (citing AICPA Press Release, Jan. 16, 1992).
173. See Rimerman, supra note 164, at 45.
174. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102, EC 6-6 (1981) provides
that "[a] lawyer who is a stockholder in or is associated with a professional legal corporation may,
however, limit his liability for malpractice of his associates in the corporation, but only to the
extent permitted by law."
175. Rule 1.8(h) of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990) provides:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an
unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that
independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.
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law. It seems clear that, if a state adopts LLC legislation and allows
attorneys to form LLCs, the ABA would not prevent such a practice.
However, only one state entity governing the practice of law has
expressly permitted attorneys to form LLCs. 76
Because it fits within the ethical rules of both professions, the
LLC is an available remedy for both accountants and lawyers to
protect themselves and to slow the effects of the crisis upon the
professional world.
V. HOW THE LLC WILL HELP SOLVE THE CRISIS
The LLC will curb the effects of excessive litigation against
professionals in four ways: (A) by eliminating the effects of "intimida-
tion" of firms with unlimited liability, (B) by reducing insurance costs,
(C) by providing professionals with the confidence necessary to
successfully serve their clients and the public, and (D) by providing a
safety net for professionals who, because of the severity of the crisis,
cannot afford liability insurance, but nevertheless are able to provide
quality services to the public.
A. Intimidation
According to at least one source, the threat of personal financial
ruin allows plaintiffs to intimidate accountants into settling disputes
out of court.177 Rather than risk both the demise of the firm and
personal bankruptcy, accountants often will choose to settle a case,
even when they believe they should succeed at trial.1 '7  This phe-
nomenon would clearly be eliminated through a limitation on liability.
B. Insurance
The LLC will also help to keep professionals' insurance costs
from skyrocketing even further. By eliminating the intimidation factor,
settlement amounts are sure to be reduced, and professionals will likely
take more cases to trial successfully, knowing that they cannot be held
personally liable. In addition, professionals would no longer need to
purchase insurance to protect their personal assets.' 19
176. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 265 (allowing attorneys to practice as LLCs).
177. Business This Week; Accountancy - Subject to 'Intimidation,' IRISH TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993,
at supp.
178. See CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, supra note 28, at 010.
179. Cf. Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Limited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 389 & n.8 (1992) (discussing the need for "portfolio insurance"
in the absence of a limited liability regime).
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Furthermore, the size of future lawsuits filed against professionals
could be reduced by the implementation of the LLC. Plaintiffs or
agencies may be less likely to sue for as large an amount if they can
reach only the personal assets of the negligent parties. This also would
decrease the risk factor involved in insuring professionals for malprac-
tice, which would presumably translate into lower premiums.
However, the conclusion that LLC legislation will have any effect
on insurance premiums is admittedly a disputed proposition. Some
experts have noted that the legislation is solely tax related and will
have virtually no effect on the market for professional insurance.80
The answer to this question is yet to be determined, but it is notewor-
thy that some insurance brokers have applauded the move toward
limited liability of professionals as something that will have a positive
impact on the professional insurance market.' 8 '
Notwithstanding the dispute over the insurance factor, the LLC's
greatest impact will not be felt in this area. Rather, the confidence that
the LLC's protection will bring to professionals is what makes the
LLC such an attractive entity.
C. Confidence
Several of the effects listed in Part II, sections A through D,
revolve around the professional's confidence. Whether it is manifested
through attracting new clients, reducing wasteful review time, or
serving riskier industries, the confidence of the professional that her
personal assets are sheltered from judgment cannot be overstated. 82
This confidence will be substantially increased by assuring the
professional that she cannot be sued personally unless she is negli-
gent.18
3
This confidence will lead to the professional's retention of high-
risk clients,' and will therefore help to prevent the fraud that occurs
when unqualified professionals serve large high-risk companies.
Furthermore, this confidence will help to prevent the professional from
180. See Janet Elliot, Partnership Liability Bill May Face Governor's Veto, TEX. LAW., June
10, 1991, at 4 (noting that "[tihe bill was driven by tax considerations rather than insurance
concerns and insurance agents say it is unlikely to reduce malpractice premiums.").
181. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, This Tort Reform is Pro-Lawyer, LEGAL TIlvES, Nov. 16,
1992, at 1 (noting that the chairman of a mutual insurance company applauded the limited
liability bill in Washington, D.C.).
182. Cf. Rimerman, supra note 164, at 49 ("CPAs can (serve public needs] most
productively and cost effectively only after eliminating the threat of losing their life savings if
another of their shareholders or partners makes a mistake or acts negligently.").
183. See id. at 49.
184. See id.
[Vol. 18:557
The Professional Liability Crisis
over-protecting herself from the threat of litigation. This process is
wasteful, and results in magnifying the economic effect of the litigation
explosion.185
D. Insurance for the Uninsured
Another way that the LLC will help ease the pains of the
litigation crisis is by providing those professionals who cannot obtain
insurance the ability to continue their businesses without it. Through
use of the LLC, they will receive some protection of their personal
assets, rather than being on the verge of personal bankruptcy.
Although the preferred situation would be for every firm to have
insurance, this is simply not the reality of today's professional arena.
Allowing uninsured professionals to maintain their personal assets
through LLC protection will protect the health of the professions.
Although its effect on the overall litigation crisis will be rather
small,186 the confidence that a limit on liability will bring to profes-
sionals cannot be replaced. In short, allowing professionals to become
LLCs will enable them to serve their clients more efficiently and cost
effectively, while further enabling them to put their minds at ease.
Indeed, one commentator has noted that the LLC could be the best
solution to the professional liability crisis, because a liability cap is
much more palatable to both congressional leaders and state politicians
than tort reform.187 Furthermore, according to one source, virtually
all professional firms now operating in partnership form would convert
to LLCs if given the choice.' This interest exists for a reason:
The LLC can end the litigation explosion.
VI. WHY THE LLC IS A PROPER ENTITY FOR PROFESSIONALS
This Part addresses the fundamental reasons why the LLC is a
proper remedy for professionals in their defense against the onslaught
of litigation in our country today. Section A introduces the public
duties of professionals and shows how the LLC is consistent with those
duties. Section B addresses policy arguments regarding whether a
limitation on liability would be beneficial to society in general.
185. See Atkinson, supra note 122.
186. The LLC will not prevent the majority of suits from being filed.
187. Andrew Wheat, CPAs See Incorporation Reforms as Alternative to Tort Law Changes,
THOMSON'S INT'L BANK AccT., July 26, 1993, at 1.
188. Vineeta Anand, Executive Update; Business Law, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 29,
1992, at 3.
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A. The Duties of Professionals
1. Accountants' Public Duty
The accountant has been referred to as a "public watchdog."' 8 9
Several cases have followed this dictum by then Chief Justice Warren
Burger,'9" and it seems to have the force of law. One court has gone
so far as to refer to an accounting firm as a "quasi-public official."' 9'
In Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,192 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
defined the public duty of the accountant in these terms: "The
auditor's function has expanded from that of a watchdog for manage-
ment to an independent evaluator of the adequacy and fairness of
financial statements issued by management to stockholders, creditors
and others."'193 The court went on to note that "[t]he certified public
accountant acknowledges a moral responsibility . .. to be as mindful
of the interests of strangers who may rely on his opinion as of the
interests of the client who pays his fee.' 1 94  This moral duty has
arisen in modem times in large part because of the increasing public
ownership of enterprises and the requirements of stock exchanges."
The extent of this duty has become the subject of much debate in
recent years. Accountants have referred to what they call the
"expectations gap" between what the public believes and what truly is
the function of an audit.196 Indeed, as one professional stated, "the
189. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818, celt. denied, 466 U.S. 936
(1984).
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status,
the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well
as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires
complete fidelity to the public trust.
Id. at 817-18.
190. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053,1059 (5th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1990); Adam v. Silicon Valley
Banc Shares, No. C93-20399, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1306, at 14 (N.D. Cal.).
191. Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
192. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
193. Id. at 149.
194. Id. at 150 (quoting J. CARCY, PROFESSIONAL ETHics OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING
(1946) at 13-14).
195. See id. at 149 n.8.
196. See Travis Morgan Dodd, Accounting Malpractice and Contributory Negligence:
Justifying Disparate Treatment Based Upon the Auditor's Unique Role, 80 GEO. L.J. 909,916 (1992)
(citing VINCENT M. O'REILLY ET AL., MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING 19 (11th ed. 1990));
McCarrol, supra note 4, at 49.
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public has a misconception that it's the CPA's job to detect
fraud."197 The AICPA standards seem to support the assertion that
CPAs lack a duty to uncover fraud.1 9 However, the conservative
view held by many professionals is in complete contrast with the
"public watchdog" viewpoint taken by many courts.
This viewpoint is accountant-specific, and other professions have
not yet been placed upon such a public pedestal. However, the
lawyer's duty to the public has been greatly increased in recent years.
2. Duty of Attorneys
Traditionally, attorneys have not been held to a "public watch-
dog" standard. However, a few courts have denied any limitation on
the professional liability of attorneys, invoking the judiciary's inherent
power to regulate the practice of law.'99 In First Bank & Trust
Company v. Zagoria, the Supreme Court of Georgia expressed concern
that, if limited liability were allowed, the practice of law would cease
to be a professional service and become a "commercial enterprise." 2"
The court went on to note that the primary distinction between the
two is "that a profession is a calling which demands adherence to the
public interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner. "201 In
support of this assertion, the court noted that the relationships between
lawyer and client and between lawyer and the other members of her
firm are special, stating that "when a client engages the services of a
197. Auditors Take Steps to Reduce Their Liability Exposure, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL CITY
Bus., Sept. 11, 1992, at 13, 14 (quoting Annette Ruzicka, Director of Communications for the
Minnesota Society of CPAs).
198. One group of pronouncements by the AICPA is Statements on Auditing Standards
(SAS), describing the accountant's duties with regard to the audit function. SAS 53 requires that
the auditor "assess the risk that errors and irregularities may cause the financial statements to
contain a material misstatement" and to "design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of
detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the financial statements." See AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS § 316
(1990). The term "errors" refers to unintentional misstatements or omissions. Id. § 316.02. The
term "irregularities" refers to intentional misstatements or omissions. Id.
However, the standard also indicates that the auditor is not an insurer. Her report "does not
constitute a guarantee." Id. § 316.08. The AICPA defends this position by noting that even a
properly designed and executed audit may not uncover irregularities such as collusion among
officers to falsify the records, as accountants are not trained to detect such problems. Dodd, supra
note 196, at 916 n.40.
199. See First Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983) (denying a limit
on professional liability of attorneys); In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973)
(denying a limitation on shareholder liability for acts of other shareholders). This power does not
necessarily extend to other professions, however. See Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 371 N.E.2d 143
(Ill. 1977) (noting that the court's power does not extend to the medical profession).
200. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
201. Id. (emphasis added).
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lawyer the client has the right to expect the fidelity of the other
members of the firm."2 2  Cases such as Zagoria have thrust the
lawyer into a position similar to that of an accountant: a protector of
the public.
Furthermore, with the recent explosion in lawsuits arising out of
the savings and loan debacle, lawyers are increasingly being thrust into
a position of public protector. According to one source, the govern-
ment could be trying to redefine the attorney-client relationship by
seeking to emphasize lawyers' duty to the public.0 3 This would be
accomplished by adjusting the duty of attorneys when they represent
clients before a federal agency, such as banking regulators, "at the
expense of their obligations to act as advocates. '"204 This approach
would most likely invade an area traditionally protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Notwithstanding this possibility, attorneys
will never quite reach the accountant's position as "public watchdog,"
due to the lawyer's position as an advocate for the client, as opposed
to an independent provider of information.
Although professionals are held to higher standards than other
businesses and individuals, they should nevertheless be allowed to limit
their liability through use of the LLC entity. This practice is
consistent with both the professional ethics and public duties of
accountants and lawyers.
3. The LLC's Consistency with Professionalism and Public Duty
As one commentator noted: "[AII arguments based on profes-
sionalism and public reputation are suspect. It is difficult to determine
what set of rules will best enhance the legal profession's reputation.
Insistence that lawyers are somehow special and different ... [is]
probably see[n] as hypocritical cant."205
This analysis should apply with equal force to accountants.
Although accountants provide services that affect the public at large,
they should not be treated specially. The analysis applied in Zago-
ria20 6 and related cases 07 is conclusory at best. The Zagoria court
simply stated that the relationships among clients, attorneys, and other
partners are special and thus professionals should not be able to limit
202. Id.
203. See American Professions, On the Defensive, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1992, at 90.
204. Id.
205. Kalish, supra note 139, at 581.
206. First Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983).
207. In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973); Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d 45
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
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their liability. What the court failed to do, however, is balance the
interests of the client in obtaining the "fidelity of other members of the
firm"20 8 with the professionals' interest in being treated like any other
business. Had the court done such an analysis, it would have
discovered that the client's interest in being able to sue every lawyer
in a firm is far outweighed by the innocent lawyer's interest in
protecting her life savings against judgment for the acts of another.
The effect of limited liability on the psyche of the client cannot
compare with the constant fear of partner malpractice that invades the
mind of the professional on a daily basis. This is especially true in
today's world of megafirms spanning the country and even the globe.
Additionally, requiring unlimited liability only because of the
higher responsibility that professionals owe society is manifestly unfair.
For example, General Motors conducts a business that affects a great
deal of the public (and, indeed, affects primarily physical rather than
economic safety), and yet neither the shareholders of that company nor
its officers are liable for any of the company's torts. No one would
argue that such a large corporation lacks any public duty. The far
reaching public duty of accountants and lawyers should also not be
translated into mandatory unlimited liability. As one commentator
noted:
Lawyers are in business .... In spite of assertions made by a few
courts, law practice in the 1980s is big business. Law firms own
buildings, libraries and equipment. They employ large staffs. They
often have many branches in several jurisdictions. Law firms need
capital, and, as other businesspersons, lawyer-owners should be
entitled to shield their personal assets . .. . When lawyers rent
space, hire secretaries and purchase equipment, they act like any
other businessperson. There is nothing peculiarly professional about
these endeavors. This is the ordinary stuff of business.2"
Accountants are similarly in business. There is no valid reason to
ignore this fact and to require professionals to practice in a form
mandating unlimited liability. Likewise, there is no policy argument
strong enough in favor of unlimited liability to deny professional firms
the opportunity to practice as LLCs.
208. Zagovia, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
209. Kalish, supra note 139, at 575-76 (citations omitted).
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
B. Other Policy Arguments Regarding Limited
Liability for Professionals
1. Public Protection
The most popular argument against limiting the liability of
professionals is that unlimited liability provides professionals with a
certain discipline and incentive to be careful, thereby further protecting
the public.210 As one politician has said, "[o]ften the best way to
ensure quality control is to impose the threat of liability." '211 Howev-
er, there are several problems with such an assertion.
First, an LLC would only protect professionals from liability for
the acts of other members.212 If a member has been negligent, has
supervised negligent work, or has participated in the negligent acts of
others, she will be held personally liable.2" 3 Thus, the LLC only
offers its protection to nonnegligent parties, who would not be
influenced by a limited liability scheme, as they have not acted
negligently.
Second, in a professional context, the goodwill of the firm is at
stake whenever a firm is named in a lawsuit. 14 Often, the firm
name will have been used for more than a century, having been passed
from one generation to the next.21 This alone provides a significant
deterrent to any professional who may feel less reason to be careful due
to a limit on her liability.
Third, the extra liability may not provide clients with any true
benefit. Although there is more incentive for partners to monitor one
another when liability is unlimited, this can be wasteful and even
counterproductive.2 6 Often this monitoring will involve the second
guessing of complex professional decisions and judgment.217 And,
as one commentator has noted, sophisticated corporate clients may
effectively monitor their own cases.
218
210. See Jack L. Carr & G. Frank Mathewson, Limited Liability as a Barrier to Entry, 96 J.
POL. ECON. 766, 779 (1988).
211. Groner, supra note 181, at 1.
212. See AICPA Members to Vote on Proposal to Let CPA Firms Form Corporations, supra
note 138, at G-1.
213. See id.
214. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 435 (1992); Carr & Mathewson, supra note 210, at 779.
215. See Carr & Mathewson, supra note 210, at 779.
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Finally, the accounting profession in particular has extensive
quality control mechanisms in place.219 These controls will remain,
regardless of the liability status of accountants.
2. Denial of Full Recovery
Another popular argument of those in favor of full liability is that
allowing professionals to form LLCs denies a plaintiff the right to be
fully compensated for her loss. 220 This argument is flawed as well.
One key problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact
that a significant amount of assets is available to victims of malpractice
even with a limit on liability. The LLC itself remains vicariously
liable for the actions of all of its members.221 This provides a
plaintiff with access to all of the marketable assets of the firm. In
addition, any participants in or supervisors of the negligent activity will
have their entire share in the firm at stake.222
Furthermore, the members will still have a substantial incentive
to purchase insurance, as professional firms often have a large net
worth that they will obviously seek to protect. 23
3. Fairness
Yet another argument against professional LLCs is that it is unfair
to allow professionals to "have it both ways" by profiting from their
professional status but not remaining personally liable for their
partners' torts.224 According to one lobbyist, the professionals, by
seeking limited liability, are saying "to heck with the people who rely
on our work and opinions. '22" This argument is similarly flawed.
First, the denial of limited liability for attorneys and accountants
puts them at a competitive disadvantage against other sectors of the
business world by inhibiting their ability to raise capital and protect
their assets.22' Furthermore, by denying a liability cap, professionals
219. Rimerman, supra note 164, at 45.
220. See Kalish, supra note 139, at 579 ("[lIt is true that if lawyer owners are not financially
responsible, these injured persons may have fewer sources for compensation than if there were no
limited liability.") Cf. Ribstein, supra note 214, at 434-35 (illustrating why clients would not
insist on unlimited liability).
221. Ribstein, supra note 214, at 435; see aLso Kalish, supra note 139, at 579-80.
222. See Ribstein, supra note 214, at 435.
223. Id.
224. Berton & Lublin, supra note 46, at 5.
225. Id.
226. Cf. Kalish, supra note 139, at 575.
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are required to answer for the sins of their peers and accept the
business risk of their clients.227
Additionally, it is illogical to argue that because an individual is
successful, that person should be allowed to be sued for things she has
not done. The fact that the "wealth of the supplier will compensate"
does not explain why all corporate executives are not personally liable
for the negligence of their employees. They usually own a share of the
company, have substantial assets, and have profited greatly from their
occupations, and yet they may limit their liability. Why are profes-
sionals singled out merely because they provide a service rather than
a product? This question cuts to the essence of the issue of unlimited
professional liability.
The personal nature of offering services should not prevent
professionals from limiting their liability for negligent acts. Long ago,
when accountants and lawyers practiced in one or two person shops,
this principle had definite application. There is an obvious public
interest in making professionals choose wisely with whom they
practice. However, in today's world of nationwide professional
practices and diverse service lines, the same reasoning cannot apply.
As one professional has said, "[a] partner in Boston shouldn't have all
of his assets at risk because another partner in Dallas made a mistake.
It's simply unfair."228
In order to achieve the most fair situation, a balance must be
struck. This balance is between the protection of the public from bad
professionals and protection of innocent and uninvolved professionals
from the loss of their homes and life savings.229 The LLC achieves
this balance. It allows for the negligent lawyers and accountants to be
sued by their victims, but protects innocent professionals from
unwarranted liability.
4. Efficiency
Allowing professionals to limit their liability is also more efficient
than the alternative. Illustrating this point are two scholars from the
University of Toronto, Jack L. Carr and G. Frank Mathewson, who
have written an article regarding the efficiency of mandating unlimited
liability upon different business forms. 30 The second half of the
227. See Daniel F. Kolb & Michael P. Carrol, Novel Lawsuits are a Threat to Lawyers,
Accountants, AM. BANKER, Feb. 15, 1991, at 4.
228. Berton & Lublin, supra note 46, at 9.
229. See Groner, supra note 181, at 3.
230. Car & Mathewson, supra note 210, at 779.
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article was dedicated specifically to law firms, and the authors assert
that this analysis applies to professionals in general. 3'
According to Carr and Mathewson, selectively applied limited
liability rules create barriers to entry into the professions and cause
those firms excluded from limited liability to be inefficiently small. 32
This is because, by requiring unlimited liability, the cost of ownership
rights is raised.2 33  This discourages investment in the firm, which
in turn causes the firm to remain small in size.2m
Furthermore, the argument goes, any partner in a law firm is
exposed to the inability of the other partners to meet their financial
obligations because of limitations on their personal wealth. A sudden
downturn in the wealth of an individual partner leads that partner to
"free-ride on his partners' ability to deal with any solvency problem
that would result. 2
35
This, in turn, leads to an allocation of resources to monitoring
costs to avoid the "free rider" problem. These monitoring costs are
then passed on to the consumers of the law firm, who pay prices that
are beyond the expected value 6f the services they receive.236
Finally, the authors show that law firms have higher average
receipts and more income per lawyer in states that allow limited
liability. This situation presumably results because larger firms, which
exist primarily in states allowing limited liability, may handle more
complex cases that require better legal talent.23  This conclusion
further illustrates the greater efficiency associated with professional
limited liability.
Although the objective of providing professionals with greater
profits may not be a valid basis for allowing lawyers and accountants
to limit their liability, protecting consumers from inefficiency and the
resulting higher costs of professional services certainly is.
Additionally, as noted above, the public protection and fairness
arguments asserted by those opposing limited liability do not outweigh
the fairness and efficiency reasons to allow professionals the protections
they deserve. As one commentator correctly noted: "[T]here does not
231. See id. at 778 (noting application to all professional services, including "accounting, law,
and medicine").





237. Id. at 780.
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seem to be a valid public policy argument for precluding the use of the
LLC form by professional service firms. 238
C. The Washington Professional LLC Act: A Model Compromise
As noted above, the Washington statute requires all professional
LLCs to maintain at least $1,000,000 in professional liability insur-
ance.239  Thus, while the Washington Act protects a professional
from liability for negligent acts of other members of the firm, it also
protects consumers from the problem of "thinly capitalized" firms with
insufficient assets to satisfy judgments or settlements.
Washington's insurance requirement provides an ideal compro-
mise between the competing interests of professionals on one side and
their clients and other users of the professionals' services on the other.
This compromise may indeed represent the necessary balance between
these interests that states prohibiting professional LLCs are seeking in
order to fulfill their consumer protection objectives.
VII. CONCLUSION
The litigation crisis in this country is having an outrageous impact
on professionals, and the lack of an adequate professional entity only
makes the problem worse. The limited liability company is a necessary
vehicle for returning to a level of sanity regarding the legal status of
professionals in our society. Several states have recognized this fact
and acted to change the status quo. However, many states have either
ignored or denied the interests of professionals in protecting their
personal assets from seizure because of someone else's negligence.
This has to change.
The LLC is the proper entity to bring about this change; it
complies with every ethical obligation and duty of both lawyers and
accountants. To deny these individuals the legal protection they
deserve is unfair, inefficient, and irresponsible. As one professional has
noted, "[t]he only barrier we have today to obtaining a form of practice
that would be more realistic and reasonable is what is not permitted by
state laws and regulations. '240  Washington has removed this barrier,
while retaining its interest in protecting consumers. Every other state
should follow Washington's lead.
238. Connaughton, supra note 159, at 197.
239. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
240. Louise D. Haberman, NASBA Annual Meeting Focuses on Uniformity and Liability, J.
AccT., Mar. 1993, at 20.
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